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Abstract
This paper investigates investment savings relationships in 26 OECD countries and how these 
relationships change when countries in the considered panel vary. Therefore panel estimations 
using annual data for the period 1970-2008 are made for different groups of developed 
countries, such as the OECD, EU15, NAFTA and G7. Additionally, this paper examines 
changes in investment saving relationships in groups of developed countries taking into 
account the presence of structural shifts in countries where they exist. Recent panel 
techniques are employed in this study to examine investment savings relationships and to 
estimate saving retention coefficients. The empirical findings reveal that the Feldstein-
Horioka puzzle exists only in the panel of G7 countries where the saving-retention coefficient 
is estimated at the level 0.754 and 0.864 for the full sample of G7 countries and for stable 
countries, respectively. The estimated saving-retention coefficient for the G7 group of 
unstable appear at the 0.482 level, indicating a higher level of capital mobility in unstable 
countries compared to stable ones. This conclusion is supported by estimations for OECD and 
EU15 countries.
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21. Introduction
For last three decades numerous studies have been carried out in attempts to explain and to 
solve the Feldstein Horioka puzzle. The phenomenon of the Feldstein Horioka puzzle (FHP) 
is related to the seminal work of Feldstein and Horioka (1980). In their study they found that 
investment and saving ratios are correlated highly in developed countries, which is an
illustration of low capital mobility. These findings are opposite to the expected low 
correlation between investment and savings ratios particularly in the sample of the OECD 
developed countries. Since then in the literature a great deal of attention has been given to the 
FHP (see, for example, literature surveys by Frankel [1992], Coakley et al. [1998], and 
Apergis and Tsoumas [2009]).
Studies on FHP differ in terms of methodology and in terms of different econometric 
techniques as well, where cross-sectional data (see Feldstein-Horioka [1980], Murphy [1984], 
Penati and Dooley [1984], Dooley et al. [1987], Coakley et al. [1998], Herwartz and Xu 
[2010]), time-series (see Miller [1988], Argimon and Roldan [1994], Jansen [1996], Coakley 
and Kulasi [1997], Caporale et al. [2005]) as well as panel data (see Corbin [2001], Ho 
[2002], Fouquau et al. [2008], Kollias et al. [2008], Georgopoulos and Hejazi [2009], 
Vasudeva Murthy [2009], Rao et al. [2010], Herwartz and Xu [2010] ) were employed.  
Empirical studies using panel data vary in their results according to different applied 
econometric techniques. For example, Fouquau et al. (2008) in a panel study on 23 OECD 
countries used the panel smooth transition regression model, where the saving-retention 
coefficient was broken down into five classes presented by factors that mostly have an effect 
on countries’ capital mobility. These factors are economic growth, demography, degree of 
openness, country size and current account balance. The results of this study indicate the 
strong heterogeneity in the capital mobility of developed countries. It was found as well that 
the estimated coefficients for the OECD sample fall generally between the years 1960 and 
2000. 
Kollias et al. (2008) employed the bounds testing procedure to test for the presence of 
cointegration in a cross-sectional sample of 15 European Union members for the 1962-2002 
period. At the same time, the authors applied panel data techniques to test for individual and 
temporal effects in the sample. The results indicated that the country specific parameter is a 
random variable, while the time specific parameter is a fixed variable with the saving-
retention coefficient being at a level between 0.148-0.157, indicating high capital mobility in 
the sample group. 
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3Banerjee and Zanghiery (2003) used a sample of 14 European Union members over 
the period 1970-2002. They employed the Johansen country-by-country cointegration test and 
Pedroni panel cointegration test. The results mostly support the integration hypothesis in the 
data series. At the same time, the authors emphasize that the consideration of the groups of 
countries and the cross-unit cointegration possibility is essential in the results' sensitivity. 
Most empirical studies with panel data have concentrated on large samples of OECD 
countries following the work of Feldstein and Horioka (1980) (see, for example, Ho [2002],
Fouquau et al. [2008], Adedeji and Thornton [2008]). Another group of studies narrows its
focus to European Union countries (for example, Banerjee and Zanghieri [2003], Telatar et al. 
[2007], Kollias et al. [2008]) or to smaller samples of OECD countries (Georgopoulos and 
Hejazi [2009], Rao et al. [2010], Narayan and Narayan [2010]). Another study compares
groups of developed and developing countries (for example, Sinha and Sinha [2004], Adedeji 
and Thornton [2008], Herwartz and Xu [2010]). Thus Sinha and Sinha (2004) in their study of
123 countries found evidence for capital mobility for only 16 countries, most of which are 
developing countries. Taking into account that macroeconomic series such as investment and 
savings are sensitive to economic and political changes domestically as well as world-wide, it 
is important to analyze saving-retention coefficients in the presence of structural breaks, if 
such exist. However, there are few studies on FHP in OECD members that take into account 
the existence of structural shifts. For example, Ozmen and Parmaksiz (2003), Telatar et al. 
(2007), Mastroyiannis (2007), Kejriwal (2008) in their studies analyze FHP with the 
possibility of structural breaks in individual countries or in cross-sectional samples. Only a
few studies consider structural changes in the panel data of developed countries (for example,
Iorio and Fachin [2007], Telatar et al. [2007], Rao et al. [2010]).
The results of FHP analysis vary with the employed econometric techniques, the 
inclusion of structural changes, the employed country samples and with different time 
periods. Therefore, it is difficult to make general conclusions on FHP analysis in the literature 
due to the absence of homogeneity in studies. 
This study employs a sample of OECD countries and makes a comparative analysis of 
different groups that are generated from OECD countries. Particularly in this study four 
different groups of countries are considered: OECD, EU15, NAFTA and G7. Members of 
European Union countries have higher possibility to have homogenous investment saving 
relations (see, for example, Blanchard and Giavazzi [2002]). At the same time members of 
more narrowed groups such as NAFTA and G7 are more likely to have homogeneous 
investment policies as well compared to a wider group of countries such as OECD. The 
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4purpose of this study is to examine investment-saving associations and to find out how they 
change in different groups of developed countries in the presence of structural breaks where 
such exist and in the absence of structural changes when they are not detected. At the same 
time, this study compares the results of panel cointegration tests with and without the 
inclusion of structural breaks when it is necessary. This study investigates the sensitivity of 
results when developed countries are divided into more homogenous groups and when the
existing structural breaks are counted in estimations.
The data sample of this study includes 26 member OECD countries except Chile, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic for a lack of homogenous data for these 
countries for the full considered period in the used source. The annual data for the 1970-2008 
period are extracted from the official statistical site of the OECD. The rest of the paper is 
organized as follows. In the next section the applied methodological approach is presented. In 
section 3 the obtained empirical results are reported and, finally, the last section concludes.
2. Methodology
This study investigates the degree of capital mobility in OECD members compared to 
different narrowed groups of developed countries taking into account identified structural 
breaks. In order to examine the level of capital mobility in OECD countries, Feldstein and 
Horioka (1980) estimated the following equation:
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Where I is gross domestic investment, S is gross domestic savings and Y is gross 
domestic product of considered country i. Coefficient β, which is known as a saving retention 
coefficient, measures the degree of capital mobility. If a country possesses perfect 
international capital mobility, the value of β has to be close to 0. If the value of β is close to 1, 
it would indicate the capital immobility of the country. The results of Feldstein Horioka 
(1980) showed that the value of β for 21 open OECD economies changes between 0.871 and 
0.909, illustrating by this the international capital immobility in the considered countries. 
These controversial results gave start to widespread debates in the economic literature. 
Numerous studies have provided evidence supporting these results. At the same time, 
different results exist in the literature with a wide array of interpretations. Therefore, the 
findings of Feldstein Horioka (1980), which are contrary to economic theory, have started to 
be referred to as “the mother of all puzzles” (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000, p.9). 
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5 In this paper different tests for the panel unit root are used. The first group consists of 
tests that do not allow for structural changes in series. These are the Levin, Lin and Chu 
(LLC) test (Levin et al., 2002), the Breitung (Breitung, 2000) test, the Im, Pesaran and Shin 
(IPS) test (Im et al. 2003), the Fisher-type tests using ADF and PP tests (Maddala and Wu 
(1999) and  the Choi (2001), and the Hadri (Hadri, 2000) test. The LLC test is based on 
orthogonalized residuals and on the correction by the ratio of the long-run to the short-run 
variance of each variable. Although the LLC test has become a widely accepted panel unit 
root test, it has homogeneity restriction, allowing for heterogeneity only in the constant term 
of the ADF regression.  The Breitung test assumes that all panels have common a 
autoregressive parameter and the presence of the common unit root process. The IPS test is a 
heterogeneous panel unit root test based on individual ADF tests and was proposed by Im et 
al. (2003) as a solution to the homogeneity issue. This test allows for heterogeneity in both the 
constant and slope terms of the ADF regression. Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001) 
proposed an alternative approach by using the Fisher test, which is based on combining the P-
values from the individual unit root test statistics such as ADF and PP.  One of the advantages 
of the Fisher test is that it does not require a balanced panel. Finally, the Hadri test is a
heterogenous panel unit root test that is an extension of the test of Kwiatkowski et al. (1992), 
the KPSS (Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin) test, to a panel with individual and time 
effects and deterministic trends, which has as its null the stationarity of the series. 
However, the considered unit root tests do not take into account the presence of any 
structural shifts in series. Therefore, as proposed by Im et al. (2005), the LM unit root test was 
employed. This is a panel extension of the Schmidt and Phillips (1992) test allowing for one 
and two structural shifts in the trend of a panel and of every individual time series. Im et al. 
(2005) illustrated that in the series where structural shifts do not exist the size of distortions 
and loss of power in the panel unit root tests remain insignificant when structural shifts are 
accommodated. However, size distortions and loss power in the tests were found to be 
significant when unit root tests were applied to the time series without taking into account the 
existing structural shifts. The break date in the Im et al. (2005) test is chosen using the 
minimum LM statistics of Lee and Strazicich (2003, 2004). In this method, the break date is 
selected when the t-statistic of possible break points is minimized.
In order to be able to apply panel cointegration tests allowing for structural shifts, it is 
necessary to examine series for stability. The Hansen’s (1992) stability test was employed in 
this study to estimate parameter stability in cointegration relationships. The test is based on 
the fully modified OLS residuals proposed by Phillips and Hansen (1990). A necessary 
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6requisite of the test is that series have to be non-stationary. The stability test produces three 
test statistics: supF, meanF and Lc. The supF statistic tests for the null hypothesis of 
cointegration with no structural shift in the parameter vector against the alternative hypothesis 
of cointegration in the presence of sudden structural shifts. The meanF and Lc statistics test 
for a cointegration with constant parameters against an alternative hypothesis of gradual 
variance in parameters, which is considered no cointegration. Particularly, the meanF statistic 
is used to capture the overall stability of the model. 
Cointegration tests were employed in this study in order to determine whether long-
run relationships exist between investment and savings. Two of them are the Kao (1999) and 
the Pedroni (1999) cointegration tests, which do not allow for structural shifts in series. The 
next one is the Westerlund (2006) panel cointegration test, which allows for multiple 
structural breaks in series. The following system of cointegrated regressors is considered for 
estimation in cointegration tests: 
ititiit xy   (2)
Where i=1,…, N, and t=1,…., T,  αi are constant terms, β is the slope, yit and xit are 
non-stationary regressors, and εit are stationary disturbance terms. Kao (1999) proposed two 
types of panel cointegration tests, the Dickey-Fuller (DF) and the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) tests. The statistics of these tests can be calculated using the following formula: 


 
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1
1 
 (3)
Where the residuals derived in the system (2) are used to calculate the test statistics (3) and to 
tabulate the distributions. The null hypothesis of the test is ,1:0 H versus 
alternative 1:1 H .
Pedroni (1999) developed a panel and group cointegration test where seven residual-
based tests (with four panel statistics and three group statistics) were introduced in order to 
test the hypothesis of no cointegration in dynamic panel series with multiple regressors. The 
first four panel cointegration tests, which are defined as within-dimension- based statistics,
use the following null and alternative hypotheses: ,1:0 H 1:1 H , assuming the 
homogeneity of coefficients under the null hypothesis. The other three group statistics, which 
are defined as between-dimension-based statistics, use ,1:0 iH   versus 1:1 iH   for all i. 
In this case for each ith unit it is necessary to calculate N coefficients i  from equation (3), 
where slope heterogeneity across countries is now allowed under the alternative hypothesis. 
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7In the long run, macroeconomic series such as investment and savings may contain a 
variety of structural changes within a country or at the international level. Therefore, in order 
to examine the regression model (1) in the case when structural breaks are detected, 
Westerlund (2006) methodology is employed in this study. This is the panel cointegration test 
that allows for multiple structural breaks accommodation in the level as well as in the trend of 
cointegrated regression. This test is based on the panel cointegration residual-based LM test 
proposed by McCoskey and Kao (1998), which does not allow for structural shifts. The 
advantage of Westerlund’s test is that it allows for the possibility of known a priori multiple 
structural breaks or it allows for breaks the locations of which are determined endogenously 
from the series. At the same time this test allows for a possibility of structural breaks that may 
be placed at different locations in different individual series. Westerlund (2006) showed in his 
work that the test is free of nuisance parameters under the null hypothesis and that the number 
and location points of structural shifts do not affect the limiting distribution. The null of the 
test is 0:0 iH  for all ,,....,1 Ni  versus alternative hypothesis: 0:1 iH   for 
,,....,1 1Ni   and 0i  for .,....,11 NNi  One of important advantages of this test is that 
the alternative hypothesis is not just a general rejection of the null like in the commonly used 
LM panel cointegration test of McCoskey and Kao (1998), but allows i  to differ across 
individual series.
Finally, in order to estimate saving-retention coefficients for groups of countries 
ordinary least squares (OLS), dynamic OLS (DOLS) and fully modified OLS (FMOLS) 
techniques were employed. DOLS and FMOLS estimators were proposed by Kao and Chiang 
(2001) for heterogeneous panels. DOLS and FMOLS estimators have the same asymptotic 
and limiting distributions and correct standard OLS for serial correlation and endogeneity that 
may present in long-run series. Kao and Chiang (2001) illustrated that DOLS outperform OLS 
and FMOLS estimators in estimating cointegrated panel regressions.2 However, in the present 
study all of described estimators, OLS, FMOLS and DOLS are employed for comparative 
purpose.
3. Empirical Results
First, in order to examine the cointegrating relationships between investment and savings 
panel series and to estimate saving retention coefficients for the considered groups of 
                                               
2 For technical details of FMOLS and DOLS estimators, see Kao and Chiang (2001).
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8developed countries, OECD, EU15, NAFTA and G7, it is necessary to investigate the
integration order of panel series. Six alternative unit root tests, the LLC, Breitung, IPS, ADF, 
PP and Hadri tests, were employed in order to test for the presence of the unit root in panel 
series. The LLC and the Breitung tests have a null hypothesis of the common unit root process 
presence; the IPS, the ADF and the PP test for a presence of individual unit root process in 
series; and finally, the Hadri test’s hypothesis is no unit root in the common unit root process. 
The results of the unit root tests are presented in Table 1. The Investment and Savings series 
in general for all four groups demonstrated the presence of the unit root in levels and no unit 
root process in their first differences. However, the LLC test rejected the hypothesis of the 
unit root presence in the levels of the OECD, EU15 and G7 investment series and in the
OECD and EU15 savings series. The IPS test rejected the presence of the individual unit root 
process in the investment series for the EU15 group. However, Banerjee et al. (2004, 2005) 
illustrated in their studies that if common sources of non-stationarity exist, tests such as the
LLC and IPS tend to over-reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity in series. The LLC test 
is based on the pooled regressions, therefore this test may not perform well compared to other 
tests in the case where there is no need for pooling in series. Im et al. (2003) illustrated that 
the LLC test tends to over- reject the null hypothesis in the case of models with serially 
correlated errors. Breitung (2000) demonstrated that if individual specific trends are included 
in pooled series the LLC and IPS tests may lose power. Therefore, based on the results of the 
alternative unit root tests, it can be concluded that the Investment and Savings series for all 
countries’ groups are generated by a non-stationary stochastic process. 
The prerequisite of Hansen’s (1992) stability test is that the variables have to be non-
stationary. The results of the various panel root tests presented in Table 1 indicated the 
existence of unit root in the considered variables. However, in order to acquire stronger 
evidence of a unit root presence in unstable as well as in stable series, the panel unit root tests 
proposed by Im et al. (2005) that allow for one and two structural shifts in series were applied. 
The results for the LM unit root tests with structural shifts for OECD, EU15, NAFTA and G7 
groups are reported in Tables 3-8. Both types of unit root tests with one and with two 
structural shifts provide strong evidence of the unit root presence in the panel series of all four 
considered groups of countries. The LM statistics for individual countries failed to reject the 
stationarity hypothesis in many cases where one structural shift was allowed. However, the 
tests in which two structural shifts were allowed, demonstrated stronger power to reject the 
null hypothesis of series’ stationarity. 
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9Based on the results of the panel unit root tests which are reported in Table 1 and in 
Tables 3-8, investment and savings series are accepted as non-stationary, therefore Hansen’s 
(1992) stability test can be applied. The results of the stability tests for all considered 
countries are presented in Table 9. Only in the cases of Australia and Spain supF do the 
statistics reject the null hypothesis of the stability of model parameters indicating the presence 
of structural change in parameters, while in all other cases the model parameters appeared 
stable. The meanF statistic, in the cases of Australia, Canada, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey and the United States, reject the 
hypothesis of cointegration in favor of the instability of the overall model in the considered 
countries. The Lc statistic rejects the hypothesis of constant parameters in most cases where 
the MeanF statistics found instability in the overall model. Countries where the stability of 
parameters is rejected are: Australia, Canada, Greece, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and the United States. The results of the stability test 
moderately clearly divide the considered countries into two groups. The first group consists of 
countries where no evidence was found for the presence of structural shifts, and these 
countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, 
Korea, Luxemburg, Mexico, Sweden and the United Kingdom. In these countries none of the 
applied tests provides evidence of instability. Another group consists of countries where at 
least one of the stability tests detected the presence of sudden structural shifts in the model. 
These countries are: Australia, Canada, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey and the United States.
After investigating the stability properties of cointegrating vectors, the Westerlund (2006) 
panel cointegration test with multiple structural breaks can be applied to the instable series. 
Tables 10-13 present the results of the panel cointegration test allowing for multiple structural 
shifts. The test was applied to the OECD, EU15, NAFTA and G7 groups, where only 
countries which were found instable by the stability test (Table 9) were included. The test was 
applied with the option to detect maximum five structural breaks. Panel A demonstrates the
results of the test in which structural shifts are allowed in constant, while Panel B illustrates 
test results where structural shifts are allowed in both constant and trend of the regression.
The results indicate that the test detected different break locations for the estimated countries. 
However, a tendency may be followed in results around some particular dates. For example, 
there is a prevalence of breaks (in constant and in constant and trend) occurring in the period 
1974-1977 for such countries as Canada, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey. This can be explained by some historical facts 
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that occurred at that time and had long-rung negative effects on industrialized economies. The 
years 1973 and 1974 were characterized by high oil world prices, the growth of which was 
stimulated by the embargo proclaimed by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting 
Countries to the United States. As a result, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
started to raise world oil prices. The oil price shock in those years combined with the stock 
market crash in the same period led to the suppression of the economic activities of many 
developed countries. 
The statistics of the LM panel test in all groups of countries differ for the case when 
breaks are allowed only in level and for the case when breaks are allowed in level and in 
trend. In the case when a break is allowed only in constant estimated statistics, for the OECD, 
EU15, NAFTA and G7 groups, it does not reject the hypothesis of cointegration, while in 
cases when a break is allowed in constant and trend, the LM statistics reject the null 
hypothesis, providing no evidence for cointegration in all considered panels. Thus, it can be 
concluded that the investment and savings variables in the panels with unstable models are 
cointegrated only around a broken intercept. 
The Pedroni (1999) and Kao (1999) panel cointegration tests were employed to series 
after finding evidence of variables non-stationarity (Table 1).  Table 2 presents the results of 
the Pedroni (1999) and Kao (1999) panel cointegration tests. The panel cointegration tests are 
applied to four groups: OECD, EU15, NAFTA and G7. Only two statistics out of seven in the 
Pedroni test provided evidence of cointegration between investment and savings series in the 
cases of the OECD and EU15 countries. However, in the case of NAFTA and G7 groups, the 
Pedroni test did not provide any evidence of the presence of cointegrating relationships 
between variables. The results of the Kao panel cointegration test demonstrate the evidence of 
cointegration existence between investment and savings series in OECD, EU15 and G7 
groups and the Kao test did not provide any evidence in favor of cointegration in the NAFTA 
group. The Kao cointegration test is quite sensitive to the information criterion used and to lag 
selection. For example, the test does not reject the hypothesis of no cointegration in the 
OECD and EU15 groups, choosing maximum 4 and 5 lags based on AIC and HQIC. As a 
result, it can be seen that there is fairly weak evidence in favor of the presence of 
cointegrating relationships in the OECD and EU15 groups and no evidence was found for 
cointegration in the NAFTA and G7 groups. Thus, there is not enough evidence to support the
existence of long-run relationships between savings and investments in developed countries.
The results of the Pedroni and the Kao cointegration tests for the panels of the OECD, 
EU15, NAFTA and G7 series which are presented in Table 2 did not provide significant 
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evidence for cointegrating relationships between the investment and saving variables. At the 
same time, the test for cointegration with multiple structural breaks detected the presence of 
cointegration in unstable series around broken intercept. However, in order to have full 
analysis of capital mobility in developed countries, it is necessary to test for cointegration in 
panels where only stable countries are included. Therefore, Table 14 presents the results of 
the Pedroni and the Kao panel cointegration tests, where OECD, EU15, NAFTA and G7 
groups are divided into groups with unstable countries (U) and into groups with stable 
countries (S). In the case of NAFTA, the Pedroni and the Kao panel tests could not be applied 
to the subgroup of stable countries due to panel absence. In this group only one country,
Mexico, is included, therefore the Johansen cointegration test was applied to the Mexico case. 
From results of Table 14 it can be seen that the division of the NAFTA and G7 groups into 
stable and unstable countries did not change the results which were extracted from the full 
sample in Table 2. Thus, in the NAFTA and G7 groups no evidence was found in favor of 
cointegration among investment and savings variables. In the cases of the OECD and EU15 
countries, again weak evidence was found in favor of cointegration among unstable series; 
however, in the case of stable series, the Pedroni and Kao tests provided stronger evidence of 
cointegration indicating that investment and savings variables are cointegrated with the panel 
of stable countries in the OECD and EU15 groups. 
Previous studies (for example, Coakley et al., 1996) suggest that cointegration 
between investment and saving series exist irrespective of level of capital mobility, which is 
the indication of current account solvency. Thus, the results of cointegration tests indicate on 
current account insolvency in the NAFTA and G7 groups and on current account solvency in 
stable countries of the OECD and EU15 countries, with weaker evidence in unstable 
countries. 
Kumar and Rao (2009) in their panel study on 13 OECD countries applying the 
Pedroni (1999) cointegration test found some evidence of cointegration in series as well; 
however, dividing the panel into pre- and post- Bretton Woods and pre- and post- Maastricht 
sub-samples decreased the significance of test statistics providing less evidence in favor of 
cointegration. Similar to the results of the present study, Narayan and Narayan (2010) in their 
panel analysis of G7 countries applying the Pedroni (1999) cointegration test, did not find any 
evidence of cointegration between investment and savings series. The authors concluded that 
the absence of long-term relationships between variables indicates the highly mobility of 
capital in G7 countries. 
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Finally, this study examines the saving retention coefficient β from Equation 1 by 
employing least squares (OLS, DOLS and FMOLS) estimators. The results, presented in 
Table 15, do not show significant difference in coefficient estimates when different least 
squares estimators were employed. Saving retention coefficients are considered for all 
considered groups of developed countries, dividing them in 3 different cases, total, unstable 
and stable. The first case indicates coefficient estimates for panels where all countries of the 
particular group are included. In the second case only unstable countries are included in 
estimations, while in the last case, only stable countries are included. 
In all cases, except for the NAFTA stable group, the saving retention coefficient was 
found with the expected positive sign. The saving retention coefficient in the OECD group is 
estimated at 0.2223, where the division of this group by unstable and stable countries did not 
change its magnitude significantly. The saving retention coefficient for EU15 countries is 
estimated even at a lower level than for OECD countries, 0.096 for the full sample, and 0.083 
and 0.119 for the unstable and stable groups, respectively. These results contradict the 
Feldstein-Horioka (1980) results, indicating capital mobility in OECD countries. Similar 
results are found in Kollias et al. (2008) where the saving retention coefficient for EU15 
1962-2002 period was found at the 0.148 level. The saving retention coefficient in the Kumar 
and Rao (2009) panel study on 13 OECD countries was found to be very sensitive to the 
choice of period and model. Thus, they found that the saving retention coefficient for the pre-
Bretton Woods period in the model with random effects is 0.742, while the estimation of 
model with fixed effects for the post-Bretton Woods period generated a saving retention 
coefficient at the level 0.266. 
The coefficient estimates for NAFTA are 0.346 and 0.398 for total and unstable 
panels, respectively, while in the case of stable countries the saving retention coefficient 
appeared to be negative -0.552 in all three cases of coefficient estimates, OLS, DOLS and 
FMOLS. The stable case of NAFTA includes only one country, Mexico. The negative 
association between investment and savings was detected and explained in previous studies 
on capital mobility (see, for example, Özmen [2007], Fouquau et al. [2008]). For example, 
Westphal (1983) in his study provided theoretical explanation for the existence of negative 
relations between investments and savings. Particularly, a high world interest rate leads 
domestic interest rates to increase promoting by this growth in domestic savings and decline 
in domestic investments. In the G7 group, however, saving retention coefficient estimates 
                                               
3 Even though estimates of OLS, DOLS, and FMOLS do not differ significantly, in the saving-retention 
coefficient discussion, DOLS estimates are used. 
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differ from other estimates according to group division. Thus, the saving retention coefficient 
is estimated at the level 0.754 in the full sample and at levels 0.482 and 0.864 in the unstable 
and stable panels of G7 group. The results illustrate that the group of unstable countries in the 
G7 group, which are Canada, Italy and the United States, have a saving retention coefficient 
which indicates moderate capital mobility in these countries. The stable countries of the G7, 
which are France, Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom, appeared to have low capital 
mobility. Thus, only the extraction of the most developed countries from the OECD group 
with stable economies appeared to fall in the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle.
The results illustrate that saving retention coefficient estimations are significant in 
panel samples. The wider panel of developed countries is considered the more general results 
are obtained. Therefore, the division of considered panels in groups with more common 
characteristics provides different and more specific results. 
4. Conclusion
This paper examined the validity of the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle for the panel sample of 
OECD countries. The OECD countries were analyzed in more narrow groups as well, EU15, 
NAFTA and G7, in order to compare the results of the analysis of developed countries when 
they are combined in different panels. Recently developed econometric methods were applied 
to annual series in order to investigate the cointegrating relationships of investment and 
savings variables, taking into account the presence of structural shifts in the model when it 
was relevant and to estimate the saving retention coefficient. To detect series where structural 
shifts took place, the Hansen’s (1992) stability test was employed. As a result, 12 countries 
out of 26 OECD countries were exposed as unstable countries. The Westerlund (2006) 
cointegration test was applied to four groups of countries, OECD, EU15, NAFTA and G7, 
where only unstable countries were included, allowing for maximum five breaks. As a result, 
evidence of cointegration was found only in the presence of constant, while no evidence was 
found when constant and trend are included. The Pedroni and Kao panel cointegration tests 
did not provide any evidence of cointegration for the NAFTA and G7 panels when tests were 
run for full samples and for sample divided into stable and unstable groups. In the case of the 
OECD and EU15 countries, the Pedroni and Kao tests provided fairly weak evidence of 
cointegration between investment and savings variables. However, when these panels were 
divided into stable and unstable groups, tests for groups with stable countries with constant 
inclusion provided much stronger evidence for cointegration presence than for full samples 
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and for samples with unstable countries indicating long-run relationships between investment 
and savings in stable OECD and EU15 countries. 
Finally, a saving retention coefficient was estimated for the OECD, EU15, NAFTA and 
G7 groups and for their unstable and stable subgroups. DOLS estimations indicated the lowest 
coefficient 0.096 for the EU15 group and the highest 0.784 for the G7 group. The division of 
the full sample by stable and unstable groups did not change the results significantly except 
for the G7 group, where the saving retention coefficient for the unstable group was estimated 
at the 0.482 level, and for the group with the stable countries, the saving retention coefficient 
increased to 0.864. 
This study illustrates that the analysis of capital mobility in OECD developed countries is 
sensitive to panel selection, OECD, EU15, NAFTA or G7. The presence of uncounted 
structural shifts may lead to the underestimation of cointegration tests and saving retention 
coefficients. The results of this study illustrate that the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle exists only in 
the panel of G7 countries, while the extraction of unstable countries significantly decreases 
the saving retention coefficient. 
5. References
Adedeji, O. & Thornton, J. (2008). International capital mobility: Evidence from panel 
cointegration tests. Economics Letters, 99, 349-352. 
Apergis, N., & Tsoumas, C. (2009). A survey on the Feldstein Horioka puzzle: What has been 
done and were we stand. Research in Economics. Forthcoming. 
Argimon, I., & Roldan, J.M. (1994). Saving, investment and international capital mobility in 
EC countries. European Economic Review, 38, 59-67.
Banerjee, A. & Zanghieri, P. (2003). A new look at the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle using an 
integrated panel. CEPII Working Paper, 22. 
Banerjee, A., Marcellino, M. & Osbat, C. (2004). Some Cautions on the Use of Panel
Methods for Integrated Series of Macro-Economic Data. Econometrics Journal, 7, 322-
340.
Banerjee, A., Marcellino, M. & Osbat, C. (2005). Testing for PPP: Should We Use Panel 
Methods? Empirical Economics, 30, 77-91.
Blanchard, O. & Giavazzi, F. (2002). Current account deficit in the Euro area: The end of the 
Feldstein-Horioka Puzzle? Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2, 147-186. 
Breitung, J. (2000). The local power of some unit root tests for panel data. Advances in
Econometrics, Volume 15: Nonstationary Panels, Panel Cointegration, and Dynamic
Panels, ed. B. H. Baltagi, 161–178. Amsterdam: JAY Press. 
Breitung, J. (2000). The Local Power of Some Unit Root Tests for Panel Data. in B.Baltagi 
(ed.), Nonstationary Panels, Panel Cointegration, and Dynamic Panels, (Advances in 
Econometrics, 15), 161-178, Elsevier Science.
Caporale, G.M., Panopoulou, E., & Pittis, N. (2005). The Feldstein-Horioka puzzle revisited: 
a monte carlo study. Journal of International Money and Finance, 24, 1143-49.
Created with Print2PDF. To remove this line, buy a license at: http://www.software602.com/
15
Choi, I. (2001). Unit Root Tests for Panel Data. Journal of International Money and Finance,
20, 249-272.
Coakley, J., & Kulasi, F. (1997). Cointegration of long run saving and investment. Economics 
Letters, 54, 1 – 6.
Coakley, J., Kulasi, F., & Smith, R. (1998). The Feldstein-Horioka puzzle and capital 
mobility: A review. International Journal of Finance and Economics, 3, 169-188. 
Coakley, J., Kulasi, F., & Smith, R. (1996). Current account solvency and the Feldstein–
Horioka puzzle. Economic Journal, 106, 620−627.
Corbin, A. (2001). Country specific effect in the Feldstein-Horioka paradox: a panel data 
analysis. Economics Letters, 72(3), 297-302. 
Dooley, M., Frankel, J.A., & Mathieson, D.J. (1987). International capital mobility: what do 
saving-investment correlations tell us? International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, 34, 
503 – 530. 
Feldstein, M., & Horioka, C. (1980). Domestic saving and international capital flows. 
Economic Journal, 90, 314–329.
Fouquau, J., Hurlin, C., & Rabaud, I. (2008). The Feldstein-Horioka puzzle: A panel smooth 
transition regression approach. Economic Modelling, 25, 284-299. 
Frankel, J. A. (1992). Measuring international capital mobility – A review. American 
Economic Review, 82, 197-202.
Georgopoulos, G. & Hejazi, W. (2009). The Feldstein–Horioka puzzle revisited: Is the home-
bias much less? International Review of Economics & Finance, 18(2), 341-350.
Hadri, K. (2000). Testing for stationarity in heterogenous panel data. Econometrics Journal,
3(2), 148-161.
Hansen, E. B. (1992). Tests for parameter instability in regressions with I(1) process. Journal 
of Business and Economic Statistics,10(3), 321-335.
Herwartz, H. & Xu, F. (2010). A functional coefficient model view of the Feldstein–Horioka 
puzzle. Journal of International Money and Finance, 29(1), 37-54.
Ho, T.W. (2002). The Feldstein-Horioka puzzle revisited. Journal of International Money and 
Finance, 21, 555-564. 
Jansen, W.J. (1996). Estimating saving-investment correlations: evidence for OECD countries 
based on an error correction model. Journal of International Money and Finance, 15, 
749-81.
Im, K.S., Lee, J. & Tieslau, M. (2005). Panel LM unit-root tests with level shifts. Oxford 
Bulletin of Econometrics and Statistics 67(3), 393–419.
Im, K.S., Pesaran, M.H. & Shin, Y. (2003). Testing for unit root in heterogenous panels. 
Journal of Econometrics, 115(1), 53-74.
Kao, C. (1999). Spurious regression and residual-based tests for cointegration in panel data.
Journal of Econometrics, 90, 1–44.
Kao, C. & Chiang, M.H. (2001). On the Estimation and Inference of a Cointegrated 
Regression in Panel Data. Advances in Econometrics, 15, 179–222.
Kejriwal, M. (2008). Cointegration with structural breaks: An application to the Feldstein-
Horioka puzzle. Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics and Econometrics, 12(1), article 3. 
Kollias, C., Mylonidis, N. & Paleologou, S.M. (2008). International Review of Economics 
and Finance, 17, 380-387.
Kumar, S. & Rao, B.B. (2009). A Time Series Approach to the Feldstein-Horioka Puzzle with 
Panel Data from the OECD Countries. MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, 
Germany.
Kwiatkowski, D., Phillips, P.C.B, Schmidt, P. & Shin, Y. (1992). Testing the null hypothesis 
of stationarity against the alternative of a unit root: How sure are we that economic time 
series have a unit root? Journal of Econometrics, 44, 159-178.
Created with Print2PDF. To remove this line, buy a license at: http://www.software602.com/
16
Lee, J. & Strazicich, M. (2001). Break point estimation and spurious rejections with 
endogenous unit root tests. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 63, 535–558.
Lee, J. & Strazicich, M. (2003). Minimum Lagrange multiplier unit root test with two
structural breaks. Review of Economics and Statistics, 85, 1082–1089.
Lee, J. & Strazicich, M.C. (2004). Minimum LM unit root test with one structural break. 
Working Papers 04-17, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
Levin, A., Lin, C.F. & Chu, C.S.J. (2002). Unit root tests in panel data: Asymptotic and finite-
sample properties. Journal of Econometric, 108(1), 1-24.
Maddala, G.S. & Wu, S. (1999). A comparative study of unit root tests with panel data and a 
new simple test. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 61, 631–652.
Mastroyiannis, A. (2007). Current account dynamics and the Feldstein and Horioka puzzle: 
the case of Greece. The European Journal of Comparative Economics, 4(1), 91-99. 
McCoskey, S. & Kao, C. (1998). A residual-based test of the null of cointegration in panel 
data. Econometric Reviews, 17(1), 57-84.
Miller, S.M. (1988). Are saving and investment cointegrated? Economics Letters, 27, 31 – 34. 
Murphy, R.G. (1984). Capital mobility and the relationship between saving and investment in 
OECD countries. Journal of International Money and Finance, 3, 327-342. 
Narayan, P.K. & Narayan, S. (2010). Testing for capital mobility: New evidence from a panel 
of G7 countries. Research in International Business and Finance, 24(1), 15-23.
Obstfeld, M., & Rogoff, K. (2000). Perspectives on OECD economic integration: Implications 
for U.S. Current Account Adjustment.  UC Berkeley: Center for International and
Development Economics Research. Retrieved from: 
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/16z3s2s2
Ozmen, E. & Parmaksız, K. (2003). Policy regime change and the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle: 
the UK evidence. Journal of Policy Modeling, 25, 137-149. 
Ozmen, E. (2007). Financial development, exchange rate regimes and the Feldstein-Horioka 
puzzle: evidence from the MENA region. Applied Economics, 39(9), 1133-1138.
Pedroni, P. (1999). Critical values for cointegration tests in heterogeneous panels with
multiple regressors. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics November (Special 
Issue), 653–669.
Penati, A., & Dooley, M. (1984). Current account imbalances and capital formation in 
industrial countries, 1949 – 1981. International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, 31, 1 –
24.
Phillips, P.C.B., & Hansen, B.E. (1990). Statistical Inference in Instrumental Variables 
Regression with I(1) Processes. Review of Economic Studies, 57, 99-125.
Rao, B.B., Tamazian, A. & Kumar, S. (2010). Systems GMM estimates of the Feldstein–
Horioka puzzle for the OECD countries and tests for structural breaks. Economic 
Modelling, forthcoming.
Schmidt, P. & Phillips, P. C. B. (1992). Testing for a unit root in the presence of deterministic 
trends. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 54, 257-287.
Sinha, T., & Sinha, D. (2004). The mother of all puzzles would not go away. Economic 
Letters, 82, 259-267. 
Telatar, E., Telatar, F., & Bolatoglu, N. (2007). A regime switching approach to the Feldstein-
Horioka puzzle: Evidence from some European countries. Journal of Policy Modeling,
29(3), 523-533.
Tsung-wu Ho, T.W. (2002). The Feldstein–Horioka puzzle revisited. Journal of International 
Money and Finance, 21(4), 555-564.
Vasudeva Murthy, N. R. (2009). The Feldstein–Horioka puzzle in Latin American and 
Caribbean countries: a panel cointegration analysis. Journal of Economics and 
Finance, 33(2), 176-188.
Created with Print2PDF. To remove this line, buy a license at: http://www.software602.com/
17
Westerlund, J. (2006). Testing for Panel Cointegration with Multiple Structural Breaks.
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 68(1), 101-132.
Westphal, U. (1983). Comments on “domestic saving and international capital flows in the
long-run and the short-run” by M. Feldstein. European Economic Review, 21, 157-
159. 
Created with Print2PDF. To remove this line, buy a license at: http://www.software602.com/
18
Table 1 Unit root tests
OECD EU15 NAFTA G7
level Δ level Δ level Δ level Δ
Investment
LLCa -2.39* -12.72* -2.75* -8.89* -0.54 -6.16* -1.65* -6.88*
I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(0) I(0)
Breitunga -1.47 -7.30* -1.33 -4.68* -0.47 -4.48* -0.78 -5.11*
I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0)
IPSb -1.52 -11.62* -2.04* -8.79* -0.53 -4.51* -1.43 -5.61*
I(1) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0)
ADFb 68.53 227.16* 43.87 130.46* 7.38 30.03* 21.91 55.75*
I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0)
PPb 27.54 379.42* 17.03 249.14* 2.03 27.72* 4.89 50.79*
I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0)
Hadric 11.58* 2.73* 8.77* 1.10 3.58* 1.84* 5.45* 0.51
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Savings
LLC -2.06* -14.21* -1.89* -10.82* 0.31 -3.26* -0.48 -6.70*
I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0)
Breitung 0.52 -11.19* 0.05 -8.62* -0.22 -2.57* -0.66 -5.05*
I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0)
IPS -0.97 -14.94* -0.35 -11.33* -0.88 -4.01* -1.43 -8.33*
I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0)
ADF 61.83 296.58* 31.32 170.61* 8.06 26.59* 20.47 86.36*
I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0)
PP 48.47 589.12* 28.02 358.87* 5.01 35.71* 16.61 106.88*
I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0)
Hadri 9.97* 5.07* 8.66* 4.42* 0.47 1.04 3.13* 1.73*
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(0) I(1) I(1)
Note: Estimations are made with inclusion of constant and trend, estimations are made with 1 specified lag, with 
increase of lag length the power of tests increases in favor of unit root presence in level estimations. 
* denotes significance at the 5% significance level
a. tests the hypothesis of the presence of the common unit root process
b. tests the hypothesis of the presence of the individual unit root process
c. tests the hypothesis of no unit root in the common unit root process. 
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Table 2 Panel cointegration tests
OECD EU15 NAFTA G7
c c&t c c&t c C&t c c&t
Pedroni
Panel v-Statistic 1.70* -1.37 1.02 -0.69 0.42 -0.84 0.56 -0.22
Panel rho-Statistic -1.28 0.14 -1.24 -0.12 -0.50 0.11 0.14 1.18
Panel PP-Statistic -1.06 -0.43 -1.58 -0.91 -0.13 0.07 0.22 1.15
Panel ADF-Statistic -2.32** -2.65** -2.69** -2.91** -0.14 0.11 -0.80 0.46
Group rho-Statistic 1.07 2.19 0.59 1.42 0.82 1.28 1.43 2.05
Group PP-Statistic 0.26 1.16 -0.89 0.27 1.13 1.18 1.05 1.92
Group ADF-Statistic -1.52 -1.67* -2.81** -2.74** 0.92 0.38 -0.45 0.99
Kao
ADF -4.09** -4.09** -1.23 -1.96*
Note: The critical values are based on Pedroni (2004). Hypothesis for Pedroni cointegration test: No 
cointegration. ** and * reject hypothesis of no cointegration at 1% and 5% level of significance.
Lag selection is based on the SIC with maximum 3 lags. 
Table 3. Panel unit root test with one structural break - OECD
Country Investment Saving
LM Break Lag LM Break Lag
Australia -2.799 1999 3 -4.671** 1993 1
Austria -3.321 1997 0 -4.482* 1994 2
Belgium -3.390 1989 0 -4.173 1983 0
Canada -2.688 1990 0 -3.059 1998 2
Denmark -4.027 1978 3 -4.048 1984 2
Finland -3.788 1990 1 -3.238 1988 1
France -4.977* 1994 2 -4.730** 1985 3
Germany -5.022** 1993 1 -3.028 1992 3
Greece -4.141 1997 1 -3.135 1990 0
Iceland -3.770 1994 1 -3.803 1985 0
Ireland -3.422 1976 3 -3.600 1992 2
Italy -3.359 2001 1 -4.573** 1983 2
Japan -2.629 1987 1 -3.514 1992 3
Korea -4.666** 1993 1 -3.981 1983 1
Luxemburg -4.897** 1985 0 -3.503 1985 1
Mexico -4.584** 1984 1 -3.159 1986 3
Netherlands -4.049 1987 2 -3.415 1986 3
New Zealand -6.061*** 1990 2 -6.100*** 1980 3
Norway -4.675** 1988 2 -2.961 1993 0
Portugal -3.841 1996 1 -6.597*** 1980 3
Spain -4.018 1980 1 -4.036 1976 3
Sweden -3.487 1990 1 -3.771 1996 1
Switzerland -3.799 1983 3 -3.041 1990 1
Turkey -4.251* 1986 2 -3.755 1980 2
UK -5.852*** 1983 1 -4.707** 1981 2
US -3.961 1996 1 -3.003 1976 3
MinLM -3.961 1996 1 -3.003 1976 3
LM statistic -17.469*** -16.512***
Notes: For the one break case, the 1%, 5% and 10% critical values for the panel LM test with a break are −2.326, 
−1.645 and −1.282, respectively. The 1%, 5% and 10% critical values for the minimum LM test with one break 
are −5.11, −4.50 and −4.21, respectively (Lee and Strazicich (2003)). The 1%, 5% and 10% critical values for 
the minimum LM test with two breaks are −5.823, −5.286 and −4.989, respectively (Lee and Strazicich 
[2001,2003]). *denotes significance at the 1% level
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Table 4. Panel unit root test with two structural breaks - OECD
Investment Saving
LM Break1 Break
2
Lag LM Break1 Break
2
Lag
Australia -4.169 1979 1998 1 -5.468** 1980 1993 2
Austria -5.875*** 1982 1993 0 -5.863*** 1981 1998 2
Belgium -4.547 1987 2000 3 -5.557** 1977 2002 0
Canada -4.620 1980 1997 1 -4.593 1980 1997 3
Denmark -5.352** 1983 1991 3 -4.985* 1981 1997 3
Finland -5.290** 1979 1991 3 -4.434 1982 1993 1
France -7.105*** 1984 1994 2 -6.761*** 1978 1993 3
Germany -6.076*** 1981 1999 3 -4.391 1975 1993 1
Greece -6.441*** 1983 1998 3 -4.739 1975 1992 1
Iceland -6.129***  1976 1996 2 -4.921 1980 1996 1
Ireland -7.032*** 1979 1993 3 -7.229*** 1980 2000 3
Italy -4.577 1983 1999 3 -5.193* 1975 1992 1
Japan -7.521*** 1987 1996 3 -5.943*** 1988 1999 3
Korea -5.721**  1975 1997 1 -5.871*** 1975 1991 2
Luxemburg -6.079*** 1984 1990 2 -4.777 1975 1985 1
Mexico -6.394***  1987 1984 2 -4.411 1982 1995 0
Netherlands -5.673**  1975 2001 2 -4.277 1986 1999 3
New Zealand -7.846*** 1980 1990 2 -7.044*** 1975 1980 3
Norway -5.827***  1978 1988 2 -6.136*** 1977 1996 1
Portugal -5.545** 1989 2001 1 -7.974*** 1980 1984 3
Spain -4.610 1984 1995 1 -4.614 1990 1999 3
Sweden -6.068*** 1982 1991 1 -5.514*** 1981 1992 1
Switzerland -5.542** 1981 1990 3 -4.615 1978 2001 1
Turkey -6.481*** 1980 1997 3 -8.360*** 1978 1986 3
UK -7.394*** 1983 1997 1 -5.799** 1976 1986 3
US -5.455** 1986 1996 1 -4.564 1980 1992 3
MinLM -5.455** 1986 1996 -4.564 1980 1992
LM statistic -36.792*** -29.804***
* denotes significance at the 1% level
Table 5. Panel unit root test with one structural break – EU15
Country Investment Saving
LM Break Lag LM Break Lag
Austria -3.763 1998 0 -3.637 1994 1
Belgium -3.158 1979 1 -4.409* 1988 0
Denmark -5.003** 1988 3 -3.690 1995 3
Finland -4.555* 1990 1 -3.336 1988 1
France -5.748*** 1995 2 -4.324* 1985 3
Germany -4.796** 1993 1 -2.587 1989 3
Greece -4.186 1988 1 -3.300 1990 0
Ireland -3.587 1976 3 -3.738 1995 0
Italy -3.396 1992 1 -5.104** 1983 2
Luxemburg -5.301*** 1990 2 -3.408 1985 1
Netherlands -3.522 1985 1 -2.818 1986 3
Portugal -3.851 1996 1 -6.013** 1980 3
Spain -4.742** 1979 1 -4.195 1980 3
Sweden -3.471 1990 1 -3.741 1990 1
UK -6.283*** 1983 1 -5.523*** 1981 2
MinLM -6.283*** 1983 1 -5.523*** 1981 2
LM statistic -15.108*** -12.892***
* denotes significance at the 1% level
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Table 6. Panel unit root test with two structural breaks – EU15
Investment Saving
LM Break1 Break
2
Lag LM Break1 Break
2
Lag
Austria -5.397** 1982 1996 0 -5.424** 1981 2001 2
Belgium -3.712 1979 1989 1 -6.648*** 1988 2001 2
Denmark -5.946*** 1978 1987 3 -5.301** 1986 1997 3
Finland -5.464** 1980 1991 1 -4.913 1982 1993 1
France -6.660*** 1978 1995 2 -5.284* 1982 1993 3
Germany -5.700** 1993 2001 1 -4.431 1986 1998 3
Greece -6.072*** 1983 2000 3 -4.897 1975 1992 1
Ireland -6.892*** 1979 1993 3 -7.321*** 1979 2000 3
Italy -4.988* 1983 2000 1 -5.501** 1983 1997 3
Luxemburg -6.870*** 1984 1990 3 -4.659 1975 1985 1
Netherlands -5.243* 1975 1999 2 -3.542 1986 1995 3
Portugal -5.450** 1989 2001 1 -8.549*** 1978 1987 3
Spain -5.241* 1984 1995 1 -5.395** 1988 2002 3
Sweden -4.806 1986 1999 1 -5.354** 1981 1992 1
UK -7.419*** 1983 2003 1 -6.066*** 1981 1986 2
MinLM -7.419*** 1983 2003 1 -6.066*** 1981 1986 2
LM statistic -23.757*** -22.755***
* denotes significance at the 1% level
Table 7. Panel unit root test with one structural break – NAFTA and G7
Country Investment Saving
LM Break Lag LM Break Lag
NAFTA
Canada -3.786 1995 2 -3.053 1976 1
Mexico -4.408* 1984 1 -5.200*** 1986 3
US -4.762** 1997 1 -3.893 1980 3
MinLM -4.762** 1997 1 -3.893 1980 3
LM statistic -6.668*** -5.921***
G7
Canada -2.972 1991 1 -3.876 1997 3
France -3.394 1996 2 -5.211*** 1986 3
Germany -4.067 1993 3 -2.862 1975 1
Italy -4.647** 1999 1 -4.789** 1983 2
Japan -3.789 1988 3 -2.926 1992 1
UK -4.482 1982 1 -5.281*** 1983 2
US -3.968 1993 1 -3.082 1975 3
MinLM -3.968 1993 1 -3.082 1975 3
LM statistic -8.382*** -8.900***
* denotes significance at the 1% level
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Table 8. Panel unit root test with two structural breaks – NAFTA and G7
Investment Saving
LM Break1 Break2 Lag LM Break1 Break2 Lag
NAFTA
Canada -5.924*** 1985 2000 2 -4.285 1980 1998 1
Mexico -5.539** 1982 1993 2 -5.545** 1988 2002 3
US -5.423** 1985 1994 1 -4.050 1980 1993 3
MinLM -5.423** 1985 1994 1 -4.050 1980 1993 3
LM statistic -10.461*** -7.542***
G7
Canada -5.822*** 1980 1999 3 -5.069* 1982 1997 3
Germany -5.153* 1980 2002 2 -6.691*** 1980 1993 3
France -5.273* 1992 1999 3 -4.744 1980 1994 1
Italy -4.817 1992 2000 3 -6.713*** 1979 1992 2
Japan -5.459** 1986 1996 3 -4.905 1987 1999 1
UK -5.867*** 1983 1997 1 -6.063*** 1981 1986 2
US -5.828*** 1987 1996 1 -5.007* 1982 1999 0
MinLM -5.828*** 1987 1996 1 -5.007* 1982 1999 0
LM statistic -15.130*** -15.779***
* denotes significance at the 1% level
Table 9. Stability tests in cointegrated relations
Country SupF MeanF Lc b1
test p-value Test p-value test p-value
Australia 2.145 0.01 102.41 0.01 901.61 0.01 -1.70 (0.37)
Austria 0.27 0.20 2.26 0.20 3.53 0.20 0.07(0.32)
Belgium 0.058 0.20 0.65 0.20 3.52 0.20 0.62 (0.37)
Canada 0.34 0.20 5.79 0.07 15.83 0.04 -0.48 (0.18)
Denmark 0.16 0.20 1.29 0.20 3.45 0.20 0.66 (0.39)
Finland 0.11 0.20 2.41 0.20 7.10 0.20 0.29 (0.19)
France 0.02 0.20 1.53 0.20 9.51 0.20 1.71 (1.23)
Germany 0.23 0.20 3.76 0.20 11.09 0.20 0.78 (0.21)
Greece 0.15 0.20 8.14 0.01 27.07 0.01 0.78 (0.10)
Iceland 0.33 0.20 2.23 0.20 5.20 0.20 0.79 (0.86)
Ireland 0.09 0.20 1.11 0.20 2.89 0.20 -0.17 (0.56)
Italy 0.45 0.13 5.42 0.09 8.54 0.20 -0.12 (0.58)
Japan 0.09 0.20 1.39 0.20 3.29 0.20 1.57 (0.52)
Korea 0.05 0.20 0.81 0.20 1.91 0.20 2.15 (1.47)
Luxemburg 0.17 0.20 1.99 0.20 4.43 0.20 0.39 (0.09)
Mexico 0.09 0.20 1.63 0.20 3.62 0.20 -0.89 (0.71)
Netherlands 0.35 0.20 9.05 0.01 67.52 0.01 0.96 (0.15)
New Zealand 0.28 0.20 6.45 0.04 34.04 0.01 -0.07 (0.43)
Norway 0.07 0.20 3.97 0.20 19.97 0.01 -1.02 (0.45)
Portugal 0.46 0.13 14.46 0.01 45.48 0.01 -0.48 (0.44)
Spain 0.89 0.01 12.19 0.01 55.82 0.01 0.18 (0.67)
Sweden 0.09 0.20 4.02 0.20 12.26 0.15 0.24 (0.14)
Switzerland 0.40 0.17 5.47 0.08 24.43 0.01 0.62 (0.23)
Turkey 0.49 0.12 5.97 0.06 12.84 0.12 0.57 (0.15)
UK 0.36 0.20 3.27 0.20 5.64 0.20 -0.31 (0.38)
US 0.81 0.20 30.60 0.01 297.47 0.01 -0.12 (0.38)
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Table10. Estimated structural breaks using the approach of Westerlund (2006). OECD
Panel A breaks in constant
Country Breaks Date
Australia 3 1979 1996 2003
Canada 4 1986 1991 1996 2003
Greece 1 1997
Italy 5 1974 1981 1987 1992 1999
Netherlands 1 1974
New Zealand 3 1975 1994 2002
Norway 2 1989 1994
Portugal 5 1974 1983 1988 1996 2002
Spain 4 1977 1987 1998 2003
Switzerland 1 1985
Turkey 1 2003
US 1 1997
Lm 2.711
Panel B breaks in constant and trend
Country Breaks Date
Australia 4 1979 1987 1993 1999
Canada 5 1974 1983 1989 1996 2001
Greece 3 1976 1983 2001
Italy 5 1975 1981 1987 1992 2001
Netherlands 5 1976 1984 1883 1998 2003
New Zealand 5 1974 1980 1990 1995 2002
Norway 4 1977 1989 1996 2002
Portugal 2 1983 1997
Spain 4 1976 1983 1990 1995
Switzerland 3 1975 1991 2000
Turkey 3 1977 1989 2000
US 4 1980 1985 1992 2003
Lm 13.919
No breaks
Lm 1.521
Lm (C) 9.606
Lm (C + T) 7.742
Table 11. Estimated structural breaks using the approach of Westerlund (2006). EU15
Panel A breaks in constant
Country Breaks Date
Greece 1997
Italy 1974 1981 1987 1992 1999
Netherlands 1974
Portugal 1974 1983 1988 1996 2002
Spain 1977 1987 1998 2003
Lm 1.989
Panel B breaks in constant and trend
Country Breaks Date
Greece 1976 1983 2001
Italy 1975 1981 1987 1992 2001
Netherlands 1976 1984 1993 1998 2003
Portugal 1983 1997
Spain 1976 1983 1990 1995
Lm 7.338
No breaks
Lm 1.207
Lm (C) 4.864
Lm (C + T) 4.345
Created with Print2PDF. To remove this line, buy a license at: http://www.software602.com/
24
Table12. Estimated structural breaks using the approach of Westerlund (2006). NAFTA 
Panel A breaks in constant
Country Breaks Date
Canada 1986 1991 1996 2003
US 1997
Lm 1.142
Panel B breaks in constant and trend
Country Breaks Date
Canada 1974 1983 1989 1996 2001
US 1980 1985 1992 2003
Lm 7.571
No breaks
Lm 0.935
Lm (C) 3.853
Lm (C + T) 4.626
Table13. Estimated structural breaks using the approach of Westerlund (2006). G7 
Panel A breaks in constant
Country Breaks Date
Canada 1986 1991 1996 2003
Italy 1974 1981 1987 1992 1999
US 1997
Lm 1.466
Panel B breaks in constant and trend
Country Breaks Date
Canada 1974 1983 1989 1996 2001
Italy 1975 1981 1987 1992 2001
US 1980 1985 1992 2003
Lm 8.140
No breaks
Lm 0.586
Lm (C) 4.858
Lm (C + T) 6.186
Table 14 Panel cointegration tests
OECD EU15 NAFTA G7
c c&t c c&t c c&t c c&t c c&t c c&t c c&t c c&t
Pedroni U S U S U S U S
Panel v-
Statistic 0.89 -0.11 1.45* -1.49 -0.12 -1.23 1.58* 0.30 0.13 -0.27 - - -0.09 -0.85 0.93 0.69
Panel rho-
Statistic -0.12 0.13 -1.55* 0.08 -0.58 0.35 -1.15 -0.55 0.54 0.91 - - 0.49 1.13 -0.34 0.46
Panel PP-
Statistic -0.02 -0.61 -1.30* -0.14 -0.92 -0.48** -1.29* -0.86 0.94 0.92 - - 0.65 1.02 -0.34 0.55
Panel ADF-
Statistic -0.28 -2.08** -2.68** -1.79* -1.73* -2.30 -2.07** -1.84* 0.61 -0.03 - - -0.11 -0.25 -1.00 0.73
Group rho-
Statistic 1.16 1.66 0.38 1.45 0.57 1.03 0.32 1.01 1.19 1.39 - - 1.33 1.73 0.74 1.21
Group PP-
Statistic 0.58 0.68 -0.19 0.95 -0.96 -0.22 -0.42 0.48 1.58 1.38 - - 1.14 1.61 0.39 1.15
Group ADF-
Statistic -0.34 -1.40* -1.77* -0.97 -2.26** -2.64** -1.85* -1.49* 1.17 0.19 - - 0.35 0.09 -0.90 1.23
Johansen 12.94 15.99
Kao
ADF -1.82* -3.77** -2.54** -3.91** -0.64 - -1.46* -1.11
Note: The critical values are based on Pedroni (2004). Hypothesis for Pedroni cointegration test: No 
cointegration. ** and * reject hypothesis of no cointegration at 1% and 5% level of significance. Lag selection is 
based on the SIC with maximum 3 lags. 
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Table 15 OLS, DOLS and FMOLS estimations
Regions Constant β
OLS
Total
OECD 0.163 (0.004)* 0.211 (0.017)*
EU15 0.189 (0.004)* 0.081 (0.019)*
NAFTA 0.119 (0.009)* 0.344 (0.051)*
G7 0.053 (0.006)* 0.728 (0.027)*
Unstable
OECD 0.167 (0.005)* 0.186 (0.024)*
EU15 0.193 (0.08)* 0.119 (0.039)*
NAFTA 0.109 (0.009)* 0.391 (0.051)*
G7 0.099 (0.009)* 0.479 (0.046)*
Stable
OECD 0.159 (0.006)* 0.227 (0.025)*
EU15 0.179 (0.005)* 0.103 (0.022)*
NAFTA1 0.289 (0.051)* -0.428 (0.233)
G7 0.032 (0.008)* 0.827 (0.034)*
DOLS
Total
OECD 0.159 (0.005)** 0.222 (0.019)**
EU15 0.184 (0.005)** 0.096 (0.022)**
NAFTA 0.118 (0.011)** 0.346 (0.054)**
G7 0.047 (0.005)** 0.754 (0.026)**
Unstable
OECD 0.170 (0.006)** 0.159 (0.025)**
EU15 0.196 (0.009)** 0.083 (0.042)*
NAFTA 0.109 (0.009)** 0.398 (0.051)**
G7 0.098 (0.008)** 0.482 (0.044)**
Stable
OECD 0.150 (0.007)** 0.267 (0.030)**
EU15 0.174 (0.006)** 0.119 (0.026)**
NAFTA1 0.316 (0.094)** -0.552 (0.427)
G7 0.023 (0.007)** 0.864 (0.032)**
FMOLS
Total
OECD -0.047 (0.004)** 0.208 (0.018)**
EU15 -0.019 (0.004)** 0.085 (0.019)**
NAFTA -0.065 (0.009)** 0.346 (0.051)**
G7 -0.146 (0.006)** 0.727 (0.027)**
Unstable
OECD -0.039 (0.006)** 0.180 (0.025)**
EU15 0.193 (0.008)** 0.119 (0.039)**
NAFTA -0.069 (0.009)** 0.398 (0.049)**
G7 -0.089 (0.008)** 0.479 (0.044)**
Stable
OECD -0.053 (0.006)** 0.229 (0.026)**
EU15 -0.025 (0.005)** 0.108 (0.022)**
NAFTA1 0.087 (0.053) -0.399 (0.241)
G7 -0.175 (0.007)** 0.824 (0.034)**
1 in the NAFTA group of stable countries only Mexico is estimated. 
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